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Institutions and Firm Formation: an Empirical Analysis of 
Portuguese Municipalities 
 
Abstract 
The uneven spatial distribution of start-ups observed for Portugal from 2003 to 2009 
suggests that local attributes, among which the quality of municipal institutions and 
their respective governance, impact the entrepreneurial process. Through the usage of a 
fixed effects negative binomial model, this thesis examines the role of municipalities in 
stimulating firm births, finding both the development of business-related infrastructures 
and the signals stemming from sound financial management to be the most relevant 
determinants. While some significance, although conditional, can be assigned to fast-
paced licensing and EU structural funding, political right-left preferences appear to 
exert a negligible influence. 
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1. Introduction: 
To ensure their competitiveness in a globalized knowledge-based economy, “places 
developed a greater need for strategic management in order to capitalize on the growth 
associated with entrepreneurship” (Audretsch et al., 2004: 317). Accordingly, large 
relevance can be assigned to an unprecedented identification of those processes through 
which local institutions and respective governance end up influencing firm births. 
Such purpose was fulfilled by analyzing the determinants of the varied spatial pattern 
of start-ups found for the Portuguese territory throughout the previous decade. 
Estimation of a panel count data model, properly accounting for regional characteristics 
and specific effects, allowed to test the significance of several indicators on the role 
played by municipalities in setting the conditions for new business creation. 
The report hereby presented is organized as follows
1
. While Section 2. summarizes 
previous research on the geography of firm formation, 3. outlines some hypothesis on 
how the municipal institutional framework may impact location decisions. All 
methodological procedures are described in 4., being the consequent results detailed in 
5. and policy implications, as well as possibilities for further investigation, derived in 6. 
 
2.1. Relevance of entrepreneurial activity for local growth: 
Since the seminal work of Schumpeter (1942), the figure of the entrepreneur has 
emerged as an important piece in the economic puzzle. For the Austrian, firm formation 
(or even its prospect) feeds a process of continuous renewal known for posterity as 
creative destruction. Such theoretical reasoning has been confirmed by several 
                                                             
1
This report comprises 25 pages (pp. 1-25) whose content is complemented by information provided in 
appendix (pp. 26-33). All tables and figures included in the main text are numbered consecutively 
following their order of appearance. The same applies to those included in appendix, being numbers 
preceded by A. for such cases (Thus, Table A.1. corresponds to the first of the appendix, and so forth).  
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empirical tests on the impact of business creation on regional growth. In fact, a 
comprehensive survey undertaken by Fritsch (2008) illustrates how supply-side effects 
resulting from firm entry tend to drive welfare through the path of enhanced 
competition. Contradicting Birch (1981), the direct contributions for net job creation 
seem negligible given the crowding-out of both incumbents and entrants that results 
from selection in a well-functioning system. Nonetheless, associated efficiency gains 
and innovation-based expansion of markets produce a positive lagged effect on 
employment which generally prevails. While analysis at the firm level supports the 
documented dynamics (Mata et al., 1995), overall effects seem conditional, not only on 
the quality of start-ups and on the financial constraints faced by entrepreneurs, but also 
on the characteristics of the region chosen for location (Acs and Mueller, 2008). 
 
2.2. Regional determinants of firm formation: 
Sharp differences arise when analyzing the yearly spatial variation of new 
entrepreneurial ventures within the same country.  In order to explain this pattern, 
understanding which factors underlie local attractiveness appears essential. 
By reaffirming the importance of economic geography, Krugman (1991) provided a 
major contribution on such direction. In his view, location decisions derive from an 
endogenous process where a circularity of demand-pull effects sustains the 
concentration of industrial activity. In accordance, decreasing transportation costs and 
prospective realization of scale economies constitute basic elements behind the 
urbanization phenomenon. Additionally, the reduced distances that characterize these 
agglomerations set the stage for frequent knowledge-spillovers. Without neglecting 
eventual reasons for local specialization, Glaeser et al. (1992) suggest that the 
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magnetism exerted by cities also lies on the frequency of such cross-industry 
interactions. Hence, firm entry is driven by the benefits accruing from diversity. 
Moreover, the regional presence of a vaster pool of qualified workforce, either in 
terms of job skills or educational background, is determinant in the business creation 
process. According to Audretsch and Feldman (1996), proximity to knowledge sources, 
namely private and public R&D-based organizations, increases the likelihood of nascent 
entrepreneurial activity, namely in the area of innovation. 
Two final factors must also be accounted for when studying local differences in 
entry. On one hand, individual decisions of moving to self-employment are much 
conditioned by wage and unemployment levels (Storey, 1991). On the other, constraints 
to firm formation posed by liquidity requirements and limited access to capital (Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989) cannot be overlooked: wealth, and therefore its regional 
distribution has an important influence. 
For two decades now, empirical research on the geographical variation of firm 
formation (e.g., Reynolds et al., 1994; Armington and Acs, 2002; Fritsch and Falck, 
2007) has examined the suitability of the theoretical predictions aforementioned in 
numerous spatial and temporal contexts.  Transversal to most studies is the high 
significance verified for demand and agglomeration variables in predicting the local 
volume of start-ups. While Reynolds et al. (1994) also came across non negligible 
wealth effects, Armington and Acs (2002) confirmed the positive impact of workforce 
qualifications and Fritsch and Falck (2007) found short-term unemployment and unitary 
labour costs to posses explanatory relevance as well.  
Prior investigation using Portuguese data broadly corroborates such outcomes: Holl 
(2004) proved that diverse rather than specialized local economies are more conducive 
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to new business creation, whereas Baptista and Mendonça (2010) observed the birth of 
knowledge-based enterprises to be potentiated by their proximity to universities.  
Overall, results indicate that, independently of the developed country under analysis, 
variation across regions is inherent to the generic firm formation process. Accordingly, 
both policy design and institutional setup at the level of localities are more effective in 
fomenting entrepreneurship than the majority of standardized national strategies. 
 
3. Role of local governance in the firm creation process: 
As previously seen, the intensity of entrepreneurial activity constitutes an important 
(although not sufficient) condition for economic growth and job generation. Being such 
phenomenon localized in its determinants, it is surprising to note the scarcity of 
literature concerning the part played by regional institutions
2
. 
This thesis originally contributes by deepening the ex-post analysis on the impact of 
local governance over the amount of firms created. Given the focus on the Portuguese 
case, the spatial and administrative unit considered is the municipality (município)
3
. 
Each of the 278 municipalities in continental
4
 Portugal is effectively empowered in 
what regards several domains of public choice (e.g., infrastructural development, land-
use planning, business licensing). As a matter of fact, in a country with almost
3
 no 
intermediate tiers of regional authority, municipalities fulfil an important institutional 
role that can be framed in five key vectors of action. Local attractiveness on the 
perspective of the entrepreneur is therefore impacted through the following means: 
                                                             
2
Notable exceptions, as Reynolds et al. (1994), Audretsch et al. (2004) and Wagner and Sternberg 
(2004), take different approaches ranging from econometric estimation to the collection of case-studies.  
3
The average mainland municipality comprises an area of 322 km
2
 with a resident population of 34.216 
inhabitants. Politically, municipalities are ruled by an executive chamber (led by a mayor) which reports 
to a deliberative assembly, with both institutional bodies being elected simultaneously every 4 years.  
4
The islands of Açores and Madeira were not deemed due to the influence of the respective regional 
autonomous governments on municipal decision making.  
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1. Infrastructural planning. Audretsch et al. (2004) highlight the development of 
industrial parks, business areas and science and technology incubators as the best 
representation of a successful start-up oriented policy. By providing the necessary 
infrastructures, as well as eventual linkages to academic and other R&D-based 
organizations, municipalities tend to draw closer potential entrants who seek the 
benefits of knowledge spillovers, synergetic scaling and cost sharing. 
 2. European structural funding. In line with the previous argument, municipalities 
growingly rely on EU mechanisms to finance several types of projects in the fields of 
human capital development, innovation and entrepreneurship, among which the 
creation of enterprise location areas is naturally included. Besides, being most of the 
territory eligible under the same core cohesion targets
5
, application efforts to 
Community funds, especially in a scenario of competitive bidding, reveals a higher 
commitment of municipal entities towards enhancing the local business environment. 
3. Licensing and regulatory framework. Prospective entrepreneurs may be deterred 
from market entry due to burdensome bureaucratic requirements. According to 
Wagner and Sternberg (2004), higher regulatory barriers and, especially, the 
prevalence of slow paced licensing can discourage any attempts of business creation 
at start. By holding a partial control over those procedures, municipalities have the 
ability to influence the likelihood of firm formation. 
4. Financial performance. Broadening the scope of the previous topic, the well-
functioning of municipal institutions must be regarded as a relevant determinant. In 
fact, the absence of sound financial management, possibly reflected on an 
exceedingly high current expenditure, may lead to a rise of local taxation to cope 
                                                             
5
Throughout the previous decade, all Portuguese continental regions, except Lisboa, were encompassed 
in the chief growth agenda for EU’s poorest regions (i.e. Objective 1 areas under the CSF III 2000-06 
strategy, later redenominated Convergence regions upon transition to the NSRF 2007-13 program).  
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with the accumulated debt service. Accordingly, the low institutional quality proxied 
by such misallocation of resources is bound to divert new enterprise ventures. 
5. Political preferences. Finally, given that ruling coalitions tend to be majoritarian, 
the way in which political forces are customarily represented in municipal governing 
bodies can be symptomatic of the population attitudes towards business creation and 
self-employment. In the view of Reynolds et al. (1994), established right-wing 
conservatism tends to be associated with a stronger entrepreneurial tradition. 
Having laid down the theoretical foundations of this study, the following section 
provides a thorough description of the variables and methods used for empirical testing. 
 
4.1. Database description and measurement of firm births: 
The majority of information used in this paper was taken from Quadros de Pessoal, a 
longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset annually updated by the Portuguese 
Ministry of Solidarity and Social Security (MSSS) on the basis of a survey that firms 
with positive payroll are legally required to submit (cases of self or wholly familiar 
employment are thereby exempted). Covering with micro-level detail all private sector 
business units having at least one wage earner, this database constitutes an exceptionally 
comprehensive source for research on firm dynamics
6
, among other topics.    
In practical terms, three interconnected files link workers to the respective 
establishments and companies, with only the latter set being considered when 
calculating the volume of business formation per municipality. Thus, the adopted notion 
of births (i.e., firm identifiers appearing from one year to another
7
 in Quadros de 
                                                             
6
For examples of past usage given such purpose see Mata et al. (1995), Figueiredo et al. (2002), Holl 
(2004) or Baptista and Mendonça (2010). 
7
To prevent firms that reemerge in the database, shortly after having left it, to be erroneously regarded 
as births, only those registrations taking no precedence in the previous five years were accounted for. 
9 
 
 
Pessoal) refers exclusively to new primary locations/headquarters, something which 
suits better any analysis on the influence of municipal institutions over 
entrepreneurship. For similar reasons, start-ups falling outside the partnership or sole 
proprietorship legal definitions were excluded
8
 given their non-profit character. 
According to the applied criteria, throughout the 2003-09 period
9
 roughly 34.460 
start-ups were annually registered in the entire continental territory, most of them (95%) 
employing less than 10 workers upon creation. For the 1.946 observations pertaining to 
such interval, this amounts to say that the average municipality experienced 122 new 
entrepreneurial ventures yearly. However, the level of firm formation behaved in a 
volatile manner across time (Figure 1.): while a slight increase is observed from 2003 to 
2005, a distinct drop took place both in 2006 and 2009, being the latter indissociable 
from a major economic downturn. Confirming such scenario, the first three years’ 
average is roughly 26% higher than the one for the remaining time span. 
Accounting for differences in the industrial structure, the weight of manufacturing in 
the start-up process has been declining throughout time, now standing below 10%. In 
sharp contrast, services increased their dominant position during the previous decade 
such that, by the last year sampled, more than seven out of ten newly created businesses 
would belong to this sectoral group. Further disaggregation
10,11
 provided in Table 1. 
shows that, although most firms are still set in the industries of commerce and local 
                                                             
8
Other entities, like foundations, cooperatives or associations, amounted to 6% of all business units 
originally surveyed.  
9
Quadros de Pessoal information at the worker-level was not made available for 2001. Given that, not 
only several regressors were computed through this database, but the nature of the econometric estimation 
itself required the usage of a lag structure, firm births were only measured from 2003 onwards. 
10
Classification of firms per sector of activity was achieved through the use of 5-digit national industry 
codes (CAE) which are strongly comparable to the 4-digit European standard (NACE). Changes operated 
in 2007 over the CAE arrangement (related to a harmonization effort that occurred after NACE’s 2
nd
 
revision) where circumvented by applying, under certain assumptions, INE’s matrix of partial conversion. 
11
Each new firm was encompassed in one of the following six sectors: manufacturing; commerce, 
business, local market (services); extraction or, finally, infrastructural development (these other sectors 
include agriculture and construction, respectively). Details are given in Figure A.1. (p. 32).  
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market supply (which jointly amount to 56% of all new ventures), business services
12
 
have been gradually acquiring importance. Highlighted by Armington and Acs (2002) 
for its knowledge-intensiveness and impact on local growth, the sector’s expansion is 
clearly patent in a mean birth rate of 15%, by far the largest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even more than temporal or sectoral differences, spatial variation constitutes a 
marked feature of the analyzed data. Unsurprisingly, the geographical pattern of 
entrepreneurial intensiveness is clearly biased towards the coastal side of the country 
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It includes financial and computing activities, as well as research and consultancy services. 
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Figure 1. Firm births across time 
Manufacturing Services Other sectors 
         Number  Share (%) Birth rate
34.463,43 100,00 % 12,57 %
Extractive 1.804,00 5,23 % 13,18 %
Infrastructures 5.301,57 15,38 % 12,83 %
Manufacturing 3531,14 10,25 % 8,85 %
Business services 4701,57 13,64 % 15,85 %
Commerce 11085,86 32,17 % 12,60 %
Local market 8.039,29 23,33 % 13,03 %
Birth rates correspond to the no. of entries per 100 existing firms.
All sectors
Notes
Table 1. Firm births across sectors (yearly averages)
  
Start-ups per 1000 in habitants 
(2003-09 average) 
 ≥ 1,49 Λ < 2,61 (70 municipalities) 
 ≥ 2,61 Λ < 3,15 (69 municipalities) 
 ≥ 3,15 Λ < 3,80 (69 municipalities) 
 ≥ 3,80 Λ < 7,50 (70 municipalities) 
 
Figure 2. Firm birth rates across municipalities 
 
 
 
 
Braga 
Porto 
Leiria 
Lisboa 
Faro 
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(Figure 2.). In fact, the number of firms created per 1000 inhabitants is particularly high 
in municipalities located in the northwest (above Porto and surrounding Braga), the 
littoral centre
13
 (close to Leiria) and the extreme south (around Faro). Reversely, the 
interior, namely the central and north-eastern regions, perform poorly in such respect. 
Research by Figueiredo et al. (2002) concluded that investors tend to locate in close 
proximity of their residence area. Nonetheless, firm formation seems unevenly 
distributed across the territory when controlling uniquely for population. This indicates 
that other factors associated to local environment, including the quality of municipal 
governance, influence entrepreneurial intensity. Appropriate econometric modelization 
addresses this subject by testing which variables weigh the most in the process. 
 
4.2. Econometric specification and methodological issues: 
From the end of the last section it became clear that the probability of observing a 
firm birth in municipality   during period  , henceforth termed       ), must be 
regarded as a function of local attributes. Given its count nature, the dependent variable 
   , i.e. the annual number of start-ups (nonnegative integers) verified for each 
municipality, is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with parameter     
        
    accounting for the respective set of municipal determinants. 
 Such stochastic process relies on the strict hypothesis of constancy in the variance to 
mean ratio, something which finds no empirical support in the analyzed data. 
Conversely, this relation tends to rise with the number of firms created, thus evidencing 
the presence of overdispersion. To handle it appropriately, a negative binomial 
specification where      follows a gamma distribution of parameters         was 
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The municipality of Lisboa also displays a high rate of business creation which is not replicated in its 
immediate neighborhood (except for Oeiras and Cascais) probably due to strong pull effects. 
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adopted. Since no municipality ever faced a complete absence of business formation, 
augmentation towards a zero-inflated negative binomial was found unnecessary. 
Non independence of the counts, given the serial correlation stemming from it, 
constitutes another assumption violation that had to be tackled. In face of unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity, residuals consistently point the direction in which a 
specific municipality deviates from the average one. Such phenomenon can be properly 
dealt through fixed-effects estimation. By controlling for local characteristics which are 
constant across time (e.g., proximity to the coast) this panel method eliminates a source 
of bias that would otherwise come from the undetected correlation with the regressors
14
. 
Addressing the mentioned issues, Hausman et al. (1984) suggested a 
parameterization for the negative binomial model that accounted for such unobserved 
heterogeneity:   was indexed to locality   and identified as the ratio            , with 
   representing the municipal specific effect. Under those transformations, considered 
parameters will become         , so that 
(1)                            
          . 
Provided that               , which contains the individual effect term, stays 
constant across time, maximum likelihood conditioned on the sum of firms created in 
the     municipality throughout the sample period      
   
   causes this parameter to 
be dropped, meaning it can assume any value for each observational group. In fact, the 
corresponding joint density comprises several gamma functions depending uniquely on 
            
   , as it was demonstrated by Hausman et al. (1984): 
(2)                                  
          
              
     
                  
              
  
                                                             
14
Alternatively, a random-effects model would regard individual heterogeneity as being uncorrelated 
with the independent variables. Hausman test results presented further ahead (footnote 20, p. 18) reject 
such scenario, meaning that the random-effects estimator was deemed inconsistent under the alternative 
hypothesis. 
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By exploring within variation and accommodating overdispersion simultaneously, 
the adopted fixed-effects negative binomial model delivers consistent estimates on the 
influence that the set of factors specified below displays over local business formation: 
(3)                      
 
               
 
            
  
    
        
 
        . 
While     embodies the number of firms created per observational unit and    retains its 
previous meaning, regressor sets          and          stand, respectively, for the role 
of municipal institutions and for other local environment characteristics. Notice that 
temporal indexation is lagged by 1 year to avoid eventual reversed causality. In 
addition, two dummy groups where considered for this specification: on one hand, 
     , encompassing binary variables that account for all Portuguese districts 
(distritos)
15
, controls for spatial autocorrelation by absorbing spillover effects which are 
transversal to neighbouring municipalities (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010); on the other 
side,       dummies expunge time-specific influences associated to the economic 
cycle. Lastly,     corresponds, as usual, to the random term. 
 Estimations relied on the use of cluster-robust standard errors to correct for 
remaining autocorrelation. As to robustness checks, these are detailed in Section 5. 
  
4.3. Institutional indicators and other explanatory variables: 
The modelization above presented associates the volume of business formation to 
regional related factors
16
. Hereupon, the purpose of this thesis is twofold: to analyze the 
extent in which municipalities stimulate entrepreneurship, as well as to evaluate how 
                                                             
15
Districts are the formal first-level administrative division of the continental territory. Despite 
geographically larger, those 18 spatial units have no de facto power when compared to municipalities. 
16
Selection of regressors was constrained by the limited availability of municipal data. All sources used, 
such as INE, DGAL and Quadros de Pessoal (own computations), are detailed in Table A.1. (p. 26). 
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controls for local environment deemed significant in earlier studies fit the observed 
sample. Although endogeneity may be a feature of some variables, something inevitable 
given the insertion of entrepreneurial patterns in a cumulative growth mechanism 
(Armington and Acs, 2002), causal interpretations may still be derived by examining 
firm birth variations within municipalities while lagging the chosen regressors. 
Recalling Section 3., the part played by municipal institutions in the start-up process 
could be sorted in five vectors of influence. Among them, infrastructural planning, 
especially in what concerns the creation of business location parks, appears to stand out. 
Oftentimes, implementation of such projects is accompanied by an increase on the 
amount of hectares per km
2
 formally designated as industrial area in the municipal 
spatial chart, a fact justifying the adoption of this indicator as a suitable proxy. Since 
most firms in services are established on residential space, differences regarding the 
strength of that determinant are expected upon comparison with manufacturing. 
Additionally, per capita access to European Union funds, which encompass all 
capital flows under the cohesion (CF), social (ESF) and regional development (ERDF) 
mechanisms, signals the efforts and institutional adaptations in which municipalities 
must engage to improve local attractiveness in the view of entrepreneurs. This rationale 
applies as well to the burden dictated by the scale of licensing requirements, proxied as 
the average unplanned length of construction works (i.e., in excess of initially predicted 
duration). Given the controls imposed on household financial constraints and economic 
cycle, a major source of delays probably resides on bureaucracy-based interruptions.  
Two further measurements are also of particular importance. On the one hand, proper 
allocation of financial resources at the local level should illustrate the managerial 
quality displayed by respective authorities, being such attributes quantified as the yearly 
15 
 
 
ratio of municipal expenditure on employees (in the sense of own personnel/staff) per 
inhabitant. On the other side, accounting for the weight of leftist mandates, i.e. 
proportion of members of the municipality’s government ideologically distant from 
right-wing traditional parties (either for current affiliation or past record), enables one to 
test how differences on both political inclination and agenda may condition the 
proneness for start-up venturing in the area. 
 
Despite portraying the relevant institutional variables under analysis, it should be 
noted that Table 2. contains only part of all regressors considered. In fact, other features 
of the local milieu (introduced in Section 2.1. and detailed below) were controlled for to 
prevent any omission-related bias from affecting the results. 
Demand expansion, to start with, is here gauged as the annual rate of young 
population growth. By solely considering inhabitants with less than 15 years of age, this 
measure circumvents endogeneity. As a complement, local market size was scaled using 
the logarithmized volume of sales per capita (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). 
Previously, it was also argued that urban contexts may enhance entrepreneurial 
activity by pooling a varied labour supply and facilitating technological spillovers. 
While the former advantage should be captured by population density, calculated as the 
  Mean   Std. dev.  Min -  Max   Correl. Hypothesis
Industrial area (ha. per square km) 1,40 2,27 0,00 -  15,04 0,34 +
European Union funds (k € per capita) 0,09 0,11 0,00 -  1,08 - 0,17 +
Unplanned length of construction (%) 26,86 12,58 1,60 -  111,22 0,08 -
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) 0,28 0,18 0,05 -  1,67 - 0,26 -
Leftist mandates (%) 55,68 24,32 0,00 -  100,00 - 0,07 -
Variables
Notes
Table 2. Summary statistics (partial): indicators of the role of municipalities
Correl. column reports the correlation with the number of firm births in all sectors.  
See Figure A.2. (p. 33) for a map-based analysis containing the two indicators here exhibiting a stronger Correl.
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Refer to Tables A.2.1. and A.2.2. (pp. 27-28) for a complete version which includes the remaining regressors.
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amount of residents per km
2
, the latter benefits ought to be reflected in the local sum of 
incumbent firms. In close connection, the extent to which a heterogeneous setting 
promotes cross-industry interactions was analyzed through sector diversity, a 
transformed Herfindahl index of employment share dispersion
17
. Moreover, given that 
reduced cost-distance patterns are inherent to the agglomerative phenomenon, one 
expects municipalities enjoying highway access to attract a greater number of start-ups. 
In terms of regional qualification, the existing stock of human capital is consistently 
found to set the stage for entrepreneurship. Accordingly, workforce skills are assumed 
to be patent in the shares of graduates (i.e. university degree holders) or researchers 
and technicians, a classification comprising knowledge intensive occupations
18
. 
Lastly, several forms of opportunity cost may impact the likeliness of firm creation. 
A higher level of wages, for instance, not only amounts to increased input prices as it 
deters eventual moves towards self-employment. The reverse would apply to a larger 
municipal unemployment rate if it was not for the economic decline also signalled by 
this measurement. Beyond labour market variables, financial constraints are accounted 
for as well. Herein, the mean value of real estate traded locally proxies the amount of 
capital available to the average household.  
 
5. Empirical results and interpretation of the regressions: 
Following the prior discussion, major hypothesis underlying local variations in the 
firm formation process were tested through a fixed-effects negative binomial model. 
Table 3. provides a summary of results regarding the all-sectors baseline specification 
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Diversity in municipality   is given by             
   
   , where    is the overall local employment 
while      represents the workforce operating in each of the 26 industries specified in Figure A.1. (p. 32).  
18
The researchers class was assumed to enclose all engineers, mathematicians, physicians, natural or 
social scientists and legal or business professionals. As for the technicians group, it includes intermediate 
level operators in the fields of engineering, health and statistics. 
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(I) described in Eq. (3), as well as a separation between manufacturing (II) and services 
(III) aimed at controlling for aggregation issues (Armington and Acs, 2002). 
 
All sectors Manufacturing Services
I II III
Industrial area (ha. per square km) 0,1170**   (2,01) 0,1635**   (2,45) 0,0289*     (1,75)
European Union funds (k € per capita) 0,0198       (0,22) - 0,0106       (0,07) 0,1166       (1,09)
Unplanned length of construction (%) - 0,0003       (0,16) - 0,0041**   (2,55) - 0,0003       (0,07)
Expend. on employees (k € per capita) - 0,4319*** (3,97) - 0,6385*** (4,19) - 0,4577*** (4,92)
Leftist mandates (%) 0,0012       (1,39) - 0,0014       (1,22) 0,0006       (0,81)
 Young population growth (%) 0,0251*** (3,97) 0,0070*     (1,81) 0,0296*** (2,78)
Sales (per capita and logarithmized) 0,0711       (1,20) - 0,0783       (1,37) 0,0107       (0,45)
Population density (k per square km) 0,0623*** (2,72) 0,1205**   (2,38) 0,1129**   (2,13)
Incumbent firms (k) 0,0202       (0,47)  0,5342       (0,97) - 0,0489       (1,35)
Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) 0,0120       (0,91) 0,0101       (0,78) 0,0055*     (1,75)
Highway access (dummy) 0,0928**   (2,45) 0,0334**   (2,13) 0,0314       (1,21)
Graduates (%) 0,0127*     (1,66) 0,0051       (0,46) 0,0105*     (1,93)
Researchers and technicians (%) 0,0111       (1,35) 0,0232       (1,41) 0,0074       (0,87)
Wages (k € per employee) 0,5864**   (2,22) 0,7904**   (2,35) 0,0997       (0,46)
Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) - 0,0242**   (2,50) 0,0060       (0,60) - 0,0139**   (2,35)
Mean value of real estate (k €) 0,0003       (1,39) 0,0002       (0,49) 0,0002       (0,93)
Year dummies χ2 (6) 471,92*** 267,97*** 337,11***
District dummies χ2 (17) 234,04*** 32,01** 41,31***
Constant 1,1384**   (2,07) 4,0739*** (6,48) 1,4068*     (1,88)
Observations 1946 1946 1946
Wald χ2 (39) 5615,3 2352,9 2916,6
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Econometric controls
Summary statistics
Notes
All explanatory variables were lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity.
For the exponential conditional mean, coefficients are interpreted as a semi-elasticity.
Standard errors were adjusted for clustering; absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Personal wealth
Table 3. Regression results for firm creation: all sectors, manufacturing and services
Births (no.) - fixed effects negative binomial model
Planning (municipalities)
Funding (municipalities)
Licensing (municipalities)
Financial performance (municipalities)
Political preferences (municipalities)
Demand
Agglomeration
Qualification
Labour market
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The above coefficients are to be interpreted as semi-elasticities evaluated at the 
exponential conditional mean, while standard errors adjust for clustering
19
. As to the 
adopted panel approach, Hausman tests performed consistently support its adequacy
20
. 
In what concerns the role of municipalities as entrepreneurship promoters, 
significance levels associated to the planning variable confirm the predictions of 
Audretsch et al. (2004). Evidence shows that an increase of industrial area by one 
hectare per km
2
 leads to a 12% rise in the firm birth probability, thus corroborating 
(under the assumptions argued in Sections 3. and 4.3.) the importance of business 
location infrastructures. Furthermore, stronger effects are expected for manufacturing 
due to the sector’s requirements on scale, set-up costs and synergetic proximity. 
A strikingly high relevance is also displayed by the assumed indicator of institutional 
quality. In fact, spatial units where financial resources are better managed seem to 
attract a higher volume of new ventures, being such phenomenon transversal to all 
sectoral groups. Accordingly, the direction of signs patented, not only reflects the 
pushing influence of ineffective local governance, as it may capture the prevalence of 
interiority municipalities who still weigh as non-negligible sources of employment. 
Regarding the regulatory framework, unplanned length of construction solely 
illustrates a situation of deterred market entry in the manufacturing case. Irrelevance of 
this licensing proxy for the services model reveals that only larger projects, usually 
asked to comply with a stringent set of norms, are discouraged upon implementation by 
slow-paced bureaucratic proceedings under the partial control of municipal institutions. 
As for the political landscape, estimation outcomes are in line with Wagner and 
Sternberg’s (2004): ideology, taken as the proportion of mandates assigned to left-wing 
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Calculations using Stata12 software relied on a cluster bootstrap routine set for 400 replications. 
20
For baseline specification (I), a              leads to the rejection of the random-effects 
hypothesis.  
19 
 
 
forces, has no part in the firm formation process. Consequently, neither the neutrality of 
business supporting policies is contested, nor voting is viewed as mirroring a traditional 
aversion towards entrepreneurial activity.   
Surprisingly alike, per capita distribution of European funds appears to exert no 
impact over local start-up intensity. Given the sums considered, the similitude in 
regional eligibility and the within-country nature of this analysis, one cannot expect 
sheer misapplication to explain those results on its own. Such reasoning suggests that 
differences across programming intervals and expenditure objectives must be properly 
handled. Therefore, alternative computations were carried out focusing solely on 
competitiveness, infrastructural enhancement or innovation projects
21
 financed under 
the NSRF (2007-13) agenda and promoted by any entity belonging to the so-called 
municipal sphere (i.e., companies owned by the local government, as well as civil 
parishes, in addition to the municipal institution per se). 
In order to match the selected sample period, only 2008 and 2009 were accounted 
for, thus precluding fixed-effects methodology. Surrogate robust models, which include 
separate negative binomial regressions for each of the two years, and a complementary 
pooled specification encompassing them both, are presented in Table A.3. of the 
appendix (p. 29). Therein, positive coefficients on Community financing are highly 
significant
22
, hence corroborating the theoretical expectations argued beforehand. 
When exploring local environment traits which are beyond the institutional influence 
of municipalities, demand behaviour and agglomeration dynamics protrude as the most 
important processes affecting overall firm formation (in line with Reynolds et al., 1994). 
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All programs mentioned are supported through regional development (ERDF) and cohesion (CF) 
funding. The social (ESF) branch was disregarded due to its emphasis on longer term goals related with 
human capital. 
22
No major changes were observed in other core municipal regressors. As to the set of remaining 
explanatory variables, despite some relevant alterations in t-statistics, the basic structure is preserved.   
20 
 
 
By inspecting once again Table 3., it is visible how a percentage point rise on young 
population growth or a density increase of one thousand inhabitants per km
2
 enlarges 
the proneness for new business ventures in 3% and 6% respectively, being those effects 
non-rejectable at any typical level. Interestingly, measures like disposable income or 
volume of incumbent firms seem to have no relevance in the model, an occurrence 
perhaps explained by their strong correlation with the above cited regressors
23
. 
Notable discrepancies emerge if taking services and manufacturing separately. Being 
the former sectoral group still dominated by births on the fields of commerce and local 
market supply, it comes as no wonder to observe such greater incidence of demand-
based variables. Inversely, manufacturers appear more susceptible to rely on a dispersed 
network of clients and, thereafter, to face heavier transport costs. In a country where 
around 85% of freight movement is done by road (Holl, 2004), that alone could justify 
the attraction stemming from highway proximity
24
. Contrasts are extensive to the used 
diversity index. As a matter of fact, the lack of significance verified for manufacturing 
is possibly echoing the existence of some industries which benefit from localized 
specialization, scenario finding no replication in column (III). 
In terms of human capital, the municipal share of graduates impacts the propensity 
for business creation
25
, meaning that a higher level of skills encourages entrepreneurial 
activity. Upon disaggregation, this merely holds true for services. Examining 
knowledge intensive sectors, Baptista and Mendonça (2010) put forward an appealing 
explanation ahead of obvious disparities in entry costs: while manufacturing-related 
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In fact, other potential predictors, such as the size of local population (correlated with density by 
0,83), were not included precisely to avoid excessive interdependence and resulting multicollinearity 
problems. 
24
Distance to the main metropolitan areas was ruled out as an alternative measure given the presence of 
district dummies in each of the models.  
25
In line with footnote 23, insignificance reported for the proportion of researchers and technicians 
derives from a 0,76 correlation with the percentage of graduates. Omitting the latter variable shifts all its 
relevance towards the former one, while producing no substantial effects over the other regressors. 
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qualifications are still scant and generally absorbed by incumbents, the competitive 
setting in services is altogether in a superior stage, thus fostering start-up ventures. 
Unexpectedly, the wage predictor yielded a negative sign for specifications (I) and 
(II). Such outcome may be reflecting either a failure of the considered qualification 
measurements in fully controlling for workforce attributes, or the unsuitability of 
exploring cross-regional rather than cross-industry input price variations (Fritsch and 
Falk, 2007). These interpretative caveats do not apply to unemployment. Its dampening 
influence over firm formation, as exposed in columns (I) and (III), illustrates how broad 
market-shrinkage effects prevail over necessity driven entrepreneurship. Lastly, after 
accounting for a plethora of variables, no significance was assigned to personal wealth. 
Supplementary variables and robustness checks: 
To confirm the consistency of results, additional estimations, whose output is 
partially
26
 exhibited in Table 4., were carried out for alternative sets of variables and 
observations or performed using different panel methods. Specification (IV), to start 
with, ascribes new indicators to the two institutional vectors previously deemed as being 
the most relevant, i.e. financial performance and infrastructural planning. For the 
former, the negative and significant impact associated to the expenditure in employees’ 
weight on total receipts substantiates, once more, how firm creation is stimulated by 
good municipal administration; As to the later, no link could be established between 
start-up intensiveness and the percentage of total expenditure allocated for capital goods 
acquisition probably due to the variety of projects funded under this category. 
As a further coherence test, both the dimension of firms in terms of employees and 
the size of municipalities in what comes to the amount of newly formed businesses had
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Although the same local environment indicators and econometric controls have been used when re-
estimating the model, Table 4. uniquely displays the coefficients on municipal regressors to facilitate 
consultation.  
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IV V VI VII VIII IX
Industrial area (ha. per square km) - 0,1347**   (1,98) 0,0928**   (3,14) 0,0461**   (2,00) 0,1040**   (2,17) 0,1024*** (3,79)
Capital goods (% total expenditure) - 0,0012       (1,55) - - - - -
European Union funds (k € per capita) 0,0420       (0,47) - 0,2011       (1,35) 0,0626       (0,69) - 0,0039       (0,03) 0,1302       (1,08) - 0,1022       (0,92)
Unplanned length of construction (%) - 0,0005       (0,40) 0,0011       (0,49) 0,0009       (0,47) - 0,0015       (0,93) - 0,0033       (1,36) - 0,0005       (0,24)
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) - - 0,6429**   (2,41) - 0,2985*** (3,05) - 0,4146*** (3,92) - 0,5849*** (5,10) - 0,9604*** (5,03)
Expend. in employees (% total receipts) - 0,0022**   (2,45) - - - - -
Leftist mandates (%) - 0,0004       (0,46) - 0,0028       (0,67) 0,0006       (0,57) - 0,0010       (1,04) 0,0012       (0,93) 0,0008       (0,84)
Joint significance χ2 (11) 48,81*** 48,00*** 45,85*** 116,93*** 185,75*** 108,81***
Observations 1946 1946 1820 1946 1946 1946
Wald χ2 (39) or (22 for VII and VIII) 2032,76 2916,6 3787,2 1067,0 2376,8 4799,7
Standard errors were adjusted for clustering; absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis; Significance at 1% denoted by ***, at 5% denoted by **, and at 10% denoted by *.
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Refer to Tables A.4.1. and A.4.2. (pp. 30-31) for a complete version which includes the remaining explanatory variables, year controls and district dummies (where appropriate).
Summary statistics
Notes
Regression IV encompasses additional indicators for infrastructural planning and financial performance; V excludes all firms born under the sole proprietorship legal regime (Portuguese civil law 
definition); VI rules out any observation belonging to the NUTSIII regions of Grande Porto (Oporto) and Grande Lisboa (Lisbon); Finally, VII, VIII and IX regard the application of different 
econometric methods.
All explanatory variables were lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity; For the exponential conditional mean coefficients are interpreted as a semielasticity.
Local environment regressors
Table 4. (partial) Regression results for firm creation: alternative variables, treatment of outliers and other estimation procedures
Births (no.) - fixed effects negative binomial model Births (no.) - other estimation procedures
Alternative 
variables
No sole 
proprietorships
No metropolitan 
areas
Fixed effects log-
linear model
Fixed effects 
poisson model
Random effects 
negbin model
Planning (municipalities)
Funding (municipalities)
Licensing (municipalities)
Financial performance (municipalities)
Political preferences (municipalities)
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to be controlled for. To fulfil the first goal, sole proprietorships were removed from the 
analysis (V), causing the dependent variable only to include partnerships, a generally 
larger form of company
27
 which represents 66% of total births. On the second case, 
observations pertaining to Lisboa and Porto metropolitan areas, which embrace roughly 
one third of start-ups, were dropped (VI) to better evaluate if municipal influences over 
entrepreneurship propensity are verified in the remaining territory. Inspection of both 
columns (V) and (VI) reveals that the importance and direction of most determinants is 
preserved, implying an identical process to be underlying all these models. 
Similar conclusions can be withdrawn from the application of diverse panel 
procedures to baseline Eq. (3). Whereas the fixed effects log-linear OLS approach (VII) 
enables analogous interpretations of coefficients despite not being itself a count data 
method, the fixed effects Poisson (VIII) relies on weaker distributional assumptions 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) and the random effects negative binomial (IX) treats 
municipal specificity as a random variable uncorrelated with the    . Albeit the deflated 
standard errors patent in (VIII) and (IX)
28
, comparison with the original fixed effects 
negative binomial estimates unveils the persistency of a common empirical pattern, thus 
corroborating the robustness of the major findings. 
 
6. Final remarks and policy implications: 
By promoting innovation and enhancing the competitive stage, a high level of firm 
creation can be seen as a prerequisite for economic development. Consequently, it is in 
the interest of municipal policy makers to encourage entrepreneurship. Portuguese data 
on the uneven spatial distribution of entrants, drawn from Quadros de Pessoal for the 
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Taking incumbents and entrants together, those corresponding to sole proprietorships tend to employ 
2,52 workers, less than the 12,11jobs provided by the average firm under the partnership legal definition.    
28
Owing to failures in properly handling overdispersion and unobserved heterogeneity, respectively. 
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2003-09 period, constitute evidence on how regional characteristics influence location 
decisions, therefore attesting such view. While some features, as demand or 
agglomeration dynamics, result from circular pull effects hardly replicable by local 
governments alone, there are areas where the action of municipal institutions overcomes 
any standardized national measures in successfully fostering business formation. 
The thesis original contribution lies in identifying those means through which 
municipalities influenced the start-up volume. Following the estimation of a fixed 
effects negative binomial model that controlled for several local environment attributes, 
two outcomes clearly stood out: Both the sound management of municipal financial 
resources, here taken as a sign of overall institutional quality, and the increase in the 
amount of land officially allocated for industrial usage, assumed as a proxy for the 
establishment of business location areas, were found to exert a positive and highly 
significant impact. This also proved to be the case for a less cumbersome licensing 
framework, if confining the sample solely to manufacturing, as well as for a greater 
access to EU structural funds, when restricting the analysis to regional (ERDF) and 
cohesion (CF) projects under the NSRF (2007-13) agenda. Conversely, the ideological 
stance of the party/coalition leading local governance seems to be irrelevant. 
In the future, one expects the growing detail of local statistics to unlock various 
research possibilities: on one hand, the computation of new regressors (e.g., municipal 
indebtedness or taxation) will allow to scan the behaviour of residuals; on the other, 
quasi-experiments resorting to a differences-in-differences approach may improve the 
understanding of the causal effects stemming from specific policy implementation. 
Finally, it would be of importance examining how the entrepreneurial attractiveness of 
municipalities varies according to size, industry and technological character of start-ups. 
25 
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Operational definition Source of raw data
Industrial area Ha. (per sq. km) allocated for industrial usage according to the official Municipal Spatial and Land-use Plan (PMOT). DGOTDU
European Union funds EU transfers (ERDF , CF  and ESF mechanisms) registered in the income statements of municipalities (k € per capita). DGAL
Length of construction Average difference between predicted and effective duration of construction works (in % of the latter). INE a)
Expend. in employees Annual expenditure of municipalities in own personnel/staff (k € per capita). INE b)
Leftist mandates Weight of mandates in the municipal government assigned to parties or coallitions ideologically leftist (%). DGAI
 Young pop. growth Annual growth of young population, i.e. inhabitants with an age inferior to 15 (%). INE b)
Sales Yearly volume of registered sales per capita, proxying personal income in each municipality (logarithmized). Quadros de Pessoal
Population density Ratio of resident population per square kilometre of municipal territory (k inhabitants per sq. km). INE b)
Incumbent firms Amount of firms (all sectors and legal regimes) existing in the municipality at the start of each year (k). Quadros de Pessoal
Sector diversity Dispersion of employment shares across the 26 industries specified in Figure A.1. (inverse Herfindahl index; see p. 16).    Quadros de Pessoal
Highway access Existence of at least one highway passing through municipal territory (dummy variable equal to 1 if such is the case). INE b)
Graduates Proportion of employees holding an university degree, i.e. tertiary level of education, as defined in ISCED 11 (%). Quadros de Pessoal
Researchers and Tech. Share of the workforce in knowledge intensive occupations, categorized as such following ISCO 88  (%; see p.16). Quadros de Pessoal
Wages Earnings of full-time employees, including base salaries, regular benefits and overtime remuneration (k € per worker). Quadros de Pessoal
Unemployment Number of registered unemployed per 100 active aged inhabitants, a proxy for the municipal unemployment rate (%). GEE and IEFP
Value of real estate Average value of real estates traded throughout the year, measuring the wealth of households (k € per estate) INE b)
Alternative explanatory variables assumed for specification IV, which are described in (p. 21), were taken from INE b) .
Variables
Table A.1. Description of explanatory variables and respective sources: baseline specification (I)
Notes
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Acronyms for data sources have the following correspondance: DGAI , Office for Internal Affairs; DGAL , Office for Local Authorities; DGOTDU , Office for Spatial Planning and Urbanism; 
GEE , Office for Streategy and Studies; IEFP , Institute for Employment and Vocational Training; INE , Statistics Portugal (being INE a) the Building and Housing Statistics  annual 
publication and INE b) the institute's Regional Statistical Yearbooks ). 
Role of municipalities
Local environment
Appendix 
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Appendix 
 
  Mean   Std. dev.  Min -  Max Hypothesis
Firm births in all sectors (no.) 121,89 212,21 1,00 -  2801,00 n/a
Industrial area (ha. per square km) 1,40 2,27 0,00 -  15,04 +
European Union funds (k € per capita) 0,09 0,11 0,00 -  1,08 +
Unplanned length of construction (%) 26,86 12,58 1,60 -  111,22 -
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) 0,28 0,18 0,05 -  1,67 -
Leftist mandates (%) 55,68 24,32 0,00 -  100,00 -
Young population growth (%) -1,09 2,15 -8,97 -  6,61 +
Sales (per capita and logarithmized) 9,23 0,72 6,95 -  12,30 +
Population density (k per square km) 0,31 0,86 0,01 -  7,59 +
Incumbent firms (k) 0,89 1,64 0,03 -  21,18 +
Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) 85,67 5,4 9,40 -  92,50 +
Highway access (dummy) 0,51 0,50 0,00 -  1,00 +
Graduates (%) 6,67 3,22 0,64 -  29,94 +
Researchers and technicians (%) 4,99 2,57 0,48 -  23,40 +
Wages (k € per employee) 0,72 0,14 0,50 -  1,66 -
Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) 5,95 2,16 1,44 -  15,20 ±
Mean value of real estate (k €) 58,08 46,95 1,72 -  291,12 +
Dependent variable
Role of municipalities
Local environment
Table A.2.1. Summary statistics: baseline specification (I)
Variables
Notes
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Summary statistics for the alternative dependent and explanatory variables used in specifications II to VI are 
available from the author upon request.
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    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11     12     13     14     15     16     17
1 Firm births in all sectors (no.) 1,00
2 Industrial area (ha. per square km) 0,34 1,00
3 European Union funds (k € per capita) - 0,17 - 0,25 1,00
4 Unplanned length of construction (%) 0,08 - 0,02 - 0,03 1,00
5 Expend. in employees (k € per capita) - 0,26 - 0,26 0,37 - 0,02 1,00
6 Leftist mandates (%) - 0,07 0,01 0,03 - 0,13 0,20 1,00
7 Young population growth (%) 0,26 0,27 - 0,25 0,24 - 0,19 0,21 1,00
8 Sales (per capita and logarithmized) 0,51 0,42 - 0,35 0,54 - 0,30 0,01 0,43 1,00
9 Population density (k per square km) 0,66 0,52 - 0,21 0,53 - 0,17 - 0,01 0,18 0,37 1,00
10 Incumbent firms (k) 0,97 0,33 - 0,27 0,47 - 0,23 - 0,07 0,22 0,52 0,68 1,00
11 Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) - 0,03 0,09 - 0,06 0,25 0,01 - 0,08 0,10 0,11 - 0,01 0,01 1,00
12 Highway access (dummy) 0,36 0,27 - 0,28 0,33 - 0,30 - 0,03 0,35 0,48 0,19 0,35 0,08 1,00
13 Graduates (%) 0,44 0,25 - 0,18 0,76 - 0,02 - 0,04 0,16 0,46 0,49 0,49 0,30 0,25 1,00
14 Researchers and technicians (%) 0,43 0,39 - 0,19 0,82 - 0,09 0,06 0,20 0,56 0,51 0,45 0,23 0,32 0,76 1,00
15 Wages (k € per employee) 0,45 0,45 - 0,22 0,73 - 0,04 0,19 0,38 0,67 0,48 0,49 0,20 0,39 0,74 0,81 1,00
16 Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) 0,09 0,03 - 0,01 - 0,06 0,06 0,17 - 0,10 - 0,09 0,09 0,07 - 0,23 0,01 - 0,04 - 0,02 - 0,03 1,00
17 Mean value of real estate (k €) 0,48 0,31 - 0,23 0,44 - 0,10 0,22 0,53 0,51 0,42 0,49 0,02 0,39 0,40 0,40 0,58 0,07 1,00
Notes
Pairwise correlations for the alternative dependent and explanatory variables used in specifications II to VI are available from the author upon request.
Table A.2.2. Correlation matrix for independent and explanatory variables: baseline specification (I)
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
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2008 2009 Pooled
X XI XII
Reg. and cohesion funds (k € per capita) 0,9866*     (2,49) 0,6866**   (2,32) 0,8332**   (2,52)
Industrial area (ha. per square km) 0,0249**   (2,03) 0,0267**   (1,97) 0,0242**   (1,97)
Unplanned length of construction (%) 0,0013       (0,30) 0,0025       (0,67) 0,0020       (0,54)
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) - 2,1476*** (7,47) - 3,4163*** (7,80) - 2,1309*** (7,87)
Leftist mandates (%) 0,0020       (1,44) - 0,0004       (1,44) - 0,0013       (1,05)
 Young population growth (%) 0,0180       (0,87) - 0,0025       (0,12) 0,2131       (1,27)
Sales (per capita and logarithmized) 0,2951*** (3,79) 0,2366*** (3,14) 0,2887*** (4,05)
Population density (k per square km) 0,0101       (0,26) 0,0045       (1,10) 0,0155       (0,51)
Incumbent firms (k) 0,3152**   (2,45) 0,2783*** (2,57) 0,3259**   (2,50)
Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) 0,0014       (0,19) - 0,0068       (0,08) 0,0028       (0,27)
Highway access (dummy) 0,2630*** (3,27) 0,2812*** (4,37) 0,2995*** (3,99)
Graduates (%) 0,0272*     (1,70) 0,0213       (1,50) 0,0255*     (1,81)
Researchers and technicians (%) - 0,0042       (0,16) - 0,0089       (0,39) - 0,0086       (0,37)
Wage (k € per employee) 1,2039*** (2,58) 0,9477**   (1,98) 1,1075**   (2,47)
Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) 0,0171       (1,18) 0,0569*** (4,05) 0,0362*** (2,74)
Mean value of real estate (k €) 0,0019*     (1,77) 0,0040**   (2,37) 0,0023**   (2,14)
Year dummies χ2 (1) - - 87,56***
District dummies χ2 (17) 70,46*** 74,81*** 58,97***
Constant 1,9057**   (2,40) 2,3072*** (2,79) 1,7137**   (2,26)
Observations 278 278 556
Wald χ2 (33) or (34 for XII) 1990,4 1921,9 2590,7
Financial performance (municipalities)
Political preferences (municipalities)
Agglomeration
The funding variable accounts for all National Strategic Reference Framework financial resources assigned to 
regional (ERDF ) and cohesion (CF ) projects benefiting any entity comprised in the municipal institutional sphere.
Table A.3. Regression results for firm creation: regional and cohesion funds under the NSRF (EU agenda) 
Births (no.) - negative binomial model
Demand
Funding (municipalities)
Planning (municipalities)
Licensing (municipalities)
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Qualification
Labour market
Personal wealth
Econometric controls
Summary statistics
Notes
Regressions X and XI correspond to negative binomial models with robust standard erros; XII amounts to a pooled 
negbin adjusted for clustering; In both cases, absolute z-statistics are given in parentheses.
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.
For the exponential conditional mean coefficients are interpreted as a semielasticity.
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V VI IV
Industrial area (ha. per square km) - 0,1347**   (1,98) 0,0928**   (3,14)
Capital goods (% total expenditure) - 0,0012       (1,55) - -
European Union funds (k € per capita) 0,0420       (0,47) - 0,2011       (1,35) 0,0626       (0,69)
Unplanned length of construction (%) - 0,0005       (0,40) 0,0011       (0,49) 0,0009       (0,47)
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) - - 0,6429*** (4,01) - 0,2985*** (3,05)
Expend. in employees (% total receipts) - 0,0022**   (2,45) - -
Leftist mandates (%) - 0,0004       (0,46) - 0,0028       (0,67) 0,0006       (0,57)
 Young population growth (%) 0,0130**   (2,06) 0,0336*** (3,33) 0,0192**   (2,31)
Sales (per capita and logarithmized) 0,0252       (1,12) 0,0368       (0,91) 0,0543**   (1,96)
Population density (k per square km) 0,1424**   (2,46) 0,0248*     (1,84) 0,5087*** (3,33)
Incumbent firms (k) - 0,0053       (0,21) 0,0021       (0,31) 0,0141       (1,14)
Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) 0,0040       (1,09) 0,0300       (0,64) 0,1370       (1,50)
Highway access (dummy) 0,0639*     (1,91) 0,0313**   (1,98) 0,0576**   (2,13)
Graduates (%) 0,0180**   (2,56) 0,0128       (1,11) 0,0168**   (2,41)
Researchers and technicians (%) 0,0079       (1,07) 0,0363**   (1,96) 0,0032       (0,39)
Wages (k € per employee) 0,5603*** (2,98) 0,3512       (1,18) 0,5558**   (2,04)
Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) - 0,0090       (1,29) - 0,0291*** (2,57) - 0,0230**   (2,37)
Mean value of real estate (k €) 0,0002       (1,05) 0,0001       (0,29) 0,0002       (0,72)
Year dummies χ2 (6) 513,69*** 56,99*** 523,72***
District dummies χ2 (17) 241,25*** 454,31*** 217,45***
Constant 1,4631*** (3,39) 2,3404*** (4,26) 1,0289**   (2,00)
Observations 1946 1946 1820
Wald χ2 (39) 2032,76 2916,6 3787,2
All explanatory variables were lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity.
Table A.4.1. Regression results for firm creation: alternative variables and treatment of outliers
Births (no.) - fixed effects negative binomial model
Demand
No metropolitan 
areas
No sole 
proprietorships
Planning (municipalities)
Funding (municipalities)
Licensing (municipalities)
Financial performance (municipalities)
Political preferences (municipalities)
For the exponential conditional mean, coefficients are interpreted as a semi-elasticity.
Standard errors were adjusted for clustering; absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
Regression IV encompasses additional indicators for infrastructural planning and financial performance; V excludes all 
firms born under the sole propritorship legal regime (Portuguese civil law definition); Finally, VI rules out any 
observation belonging to the NUTSIII regions of Grande Porto (Oporto) and Grande Lisboa  (Lisbon).
Alternative 
Variables
Agglomeration
Notes
Qualification
Labour market
Personal wealth
Econometric controls
Summary statistics
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VII VIII IX
Industrial area (ha. per square km) 0,0461**   (2,00) 0,1040**   (2,17) 0,1024*** (3,79)
European Union funds (k € per capita) - 0,0039       (0,03) 0,1302       (1,08) - 0,1022       (0,92)
Unplanned length of construction (%) - 0,0015       (0,93) - 0,0033       (1,36) - 0,0005       (0,24)
Expend. in employees (k € per capita) - 0,4146*** (3,92) - 0,5849*** (5,10) - 0,9604*** (5,03)
Leftist mandates (%) - 0,0010       (1,04) 0,0012       (0,93) 0,0008       (0,84)
 Young population growth (%) 0,0014*     (1,93) 0,0207**   (2,06) 0,0398*** (4,21)
Sales (per capita and logarithmized) - 0,0355       (0,89) - 0,0229       (0,57) 0,1163*** (4,76)
Population density (k per square km) 0,1882*** (2,86) 0,0609*** (4,34) 0,1623*** (4,39)
Incumbent firms (k) - 0,1545       (1,35) - 0,1325*** (2,91) 0,0088*     (1,84)
Sector diversity (inverse herfindahl index) - 0,0030       (0,53) - 0,0010       (0,19) 0,0882**   (2,62)
Highway access (dummy) 0,0053       (1,28) 0,0416*** (4,60) 0,0398*** (4,21)
Graduates (%) 0,0220**   (2,49) - 0,0006       (0,05) 0,0121       (1,50)
Researchers and technicians (%) - 0,0022       (0,27) 0,0175**   (2,12) 0,0140*     (1,74)
Wage (k € per employee) 0,1391       (0,51) 0,2565*** (3,69) 0,4039       (1,45)
Unemployment (per 100 active aged pop.) 0,0005       (0,06) - 0,0100**   (2,22) - 0,0156*     (1,82)
Mean value of real estate (k €) - 0,0001       (0,35) 0,0004*     (1,71) 0,0004       (1,04)
Year dum. χ2 (6) 324,60*** 261,54*** 435,93***
District dummies  χ2 (17) - - 102,56***
Constant 4,6838*** (7,51) - -
Observations 1946 1946 1946
Wald χ2 (22) or (39 for IX) 1067,0 2376,8 4799,7
Fixed effects log-
linear model
Fixed effects 
poisson model
Random effects 
negbin model
Births (no.) - other estimation procedures
Table A.4.2. Regression results for firm creation: other estimation procedures
Summary statistics
Planning (municipalities)
Funding (municipalities)
Licensing (municipalities)
Financial performance (municipalities)
Political preferences (municipalities)
Demand
Qualification
Labour market
Personal wealth
Econometric controls
Agglomeration
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.
Notes
For the exponential conditional mean coefficients are interpreted as a semielasticity.
All explanatory variables were lagged one period to account for potential endogeneity.
Standard errors were adjusted for clustering; absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Regressions VII, VIII and IX regard the application of different econometric methods.
Symbol k  stands for thousands; ha. stands for hectares.
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Sectoral group Sector Industry
Other Sectors Extraction Agriculture, fishing and related activities
Mining and quarrying
Infrastructures Construction and related activities
Electricity, water and gas supply
Manufacturing Basic and fabricated metals
Glass, ceramics and contruction materials
Food, beverages and tobacco
Leather and textiles
 Wood and similar products
Pulp, paper and similar products
Rubber and plastics
Chemicals, synthetic fibers and refining
Electrical and optical equipment
Transportation equipment
Other equipments and machinery
Other manufacturing activities
Services Business Financial intermediation
Business and renting activities
Commerce Transport and storage
Wholesale and retail trade
Local market supply Education and related services
Health and social work
Public administration and organizations
Hotels and restaurants
Leisure-related services
Household-related and other services
Notes
Figure A.1. Sectoral and industrial disaggregation of economic activity
This breakdown was performed using the 5-digit Portuguese industry codes (CAE ). A methodological break resulting from 
the general  review operated in 2007 (CAE-Rev.2.1  to CAE-Rev.3 ) made it necessary to apply  INE's table of partial 
conversion (assumptions performed by the author can be detailed upon request).  
Highlighted industries are widely recognized for their knowledge intensiveness (see Armington and Acs, 2002, or Fritsch 
and Falk, 2007).  
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Notes 
     Spatial patterns hereby presented must be confronted with the distribution of start-ups per 1000 inhabitants shown in Figure 2. (p. 10). Additionally, core areas are identified in there. 
     Although estimations conducted are solely focused on within variation (Section 4.2.), graphical comparisons between municipalities serve as further empirical motivation. 
 
 
   
Figure A.2. Map-based comparison between municipalities: firm formation and institutional indicators on infrastructural planning and financial performance 
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